'지식-우선' 행위철학의 전망

초록

According to the standard view of action, actions are explained by beliefs and desires. While it is sometimes acknowledged that the truth of belief is also required in order to explain a “successful” action, the role of knowledge in action is still excluded. This paper opposes such a view and defends the commonsensical position that knowledge plays an essential role in action. To this end, it examines the views of Timothy Williamson and John Gibbons, both of whom have advanced a “knowledge-first” theory of action, and ultimately endorses and develops Gibbons’s account. The central idea is that even when an action is caused by a belief and a desire, and the belief is true so that the intended goal is in fact achieved, the achievement may fall short of counting as intentional action if it is due to “luck,” and this shortfall is attributable to the absence of knowledge. In addition, this paper draws on Duncan Pritchard’s notions of “luck” and “safety” of knowledge to offer a systematic analysis of the relationship between intentional action and knowledge.

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