국제중재 절차에서의 전략적 위임과 선발자 효과 : 순차적 중재 게임의 분석

초록

Purpose : This paper examines whether firms in arbitration have an incentive to become the first mover when they can strategically delegate tasks to their lawyers. Research design, data, methodology : The study employs a two-stage game model where firms first set a lawyer's incentive scheme based on relative performance. Lawyers then choose an effort level that determines the arbitration outcome, with their pay tied to the performance difference. Results : The findings indicate that simultaneous moves result in zero profits for both firms. However, in a sequential game, the first mover secures a positive profit while the follower incurs an equivalent loss, an advantage gained by strategically committing to an effort level first. Conclusions : The study shows that firms possess a strong incentive to gain first-mover status, which can trigger pre-hearing procedural competition. This has significant implications for the design of arbitration rules and suggests avenues for future research.

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