감정적 행위와 이해: 합리적 행위에서의 감정의 역할

초록

In the Western philosophical tradition, emotional or emotionally motivated actions have typically been regarded as paradigmatic cases of irrational action. Within this tradition, akratic actions caused by emotions are generally considered irrational. Challenging this traditional view, scholars such as Alison McIntyre and Karen Jones argue that emotions are mental states that provide agents with certain information, and that actions caused by emotions are, in fact, reason-based actions grounded in the information provided. According to their view, akratic actions caused by emotions are rational actions precisely because the agent acts in consideration of their emotions, and such actions can sometimes even be moral. This type of akrasia, which has the potential to be rational and even moral, is referred to as “inverse akrasia.” In this paper, I aim to demonstrate the possibility of inverse akrasia caused by emotions by advancing the following claims: First, emotions are mental states that enable us to understand the world based on the narrative structure of our lives. Second, actions guided by these emotional understandings maintain the narrative unity of our lives, thereby enabling the agent to pursue authenticity in their life. Third, akratic actions caused by emotions are rational because they involve good reasons—specifically, the agent's motivation to preserve the narrative unity of their life and pursue authenticity through their actions. Through this exploration, I will show that emotions should be recognized as essential elements for understanding others' actions and engaging in communication with others.

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