셀라스의 칸트와 맥도웰의 칸트-�순수이성비판�에서� 감각� 인상의� 역할과� 객관적� 실재성

초록

In this paper we examine McDowell's criticism of Sellars's interpretation of Kant and argue that Sellars's reading of Kant aligns more closely with Kant's own claims than McDowell's does. In particular, we focus on Sellars's view that the existence of sense impressions is postulated on transcendental grounds in Kant's philosophy. According to McDowell, this view stems from ‘ a sideways-on view ’ , which distorts Kant’ s transcendental perspective. However, we contend that McDowell misunderstands the meaning of ‘ postulate ’ in Sellars ’ s interpretation. By directly examining Kant’ s own statements, we argue that such a postulate does not aim to assign an ultimate justificatory role to sense impressions; rather, it is the result of Kant's profound insight into the finite conditions of human cognition and his transcendental reflection on them. For this purpose, in Chapter 2, we will first identify the philosophical context in which McDowell presents his conceptualist interpretation of Kant and consider how he criticizes Sellars in pursuit of a correct interpretation of Kant. Then, in Chapter 3, we will show that McDowell’ s criticism of Sellars stems from a misunderstanding of both Sellars and Kant’ s transcendental perspective. Most importantly, McDowell misinterprets the reason why Sellars ’ Kant postulates sense impressions. To clarify this misunderstanding, we will directly refer to Kant. In Chapter 4, we will argue that Kant grounds the objective reality of empirical cognitions not in sense impressions but in the original unity of transcendental apperception, and thereby Kant seeks to overcome not only McDowell's concern about ‘the Myth of the Given ’ but also his concern about ‘frictionless spinning in a void’ . Finally, in Chapter 5, we will elucidate why Sellars ’ Kant postulates sense impressions and briefly identify the future tasks that remain for us.

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